Coal, natural gas and oil markets after World War II: what's old, what' s new? by Mine K. Yücel & Shengyi Guo











This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org)Coal. Natural  Gas and Oil  Markets after World IVar II:
YVhat's  Old. What's New?
Mine I(  Yticel  Research  Department
Federal Reserve  Bank of Dallas
and
Shengli Guo, Research  Department
Federal Reserve  Bank of Dallas
The views expressed  in this article are solely those of the authors and should not be attributed
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or to the Federal Reserve Svstem.COAL,  NATURAL  GAS  AND  OIL MARKETS  AFTER  I.IORLD  !l|AR
I.'HAT'S  OLD.  I'HAT'S  NEl.,?
Mi  ne K. Yiicel
Senior  Economist  and  Po1  icy Advisor
and
Shengyi  Guo





Bank  of Dal  I  as
655906
75265-5906
July  1993Energy  is again  beconing  a hot pol  icy topic.  Concerns  about  the
environment,  energy  security, global competitiveness  and  even  the budget
defibit are bringing  energy  po)  icy into the Iimelight.  To  have  successful
energy  po1  icy however,  one  must  have  a good  understanding  of energy  markets
and  energy  price relationships.  U.S. energy  markets  have  undergone  many
changes  since the end  of llorld }lar II  (tlllll)  and  energy  prices reflect  these
changes. The  purpose  of this  paper  is to provide  a better understanding  of
the interactions and  long-run  relationships between  coal  , natural gas  and  oil
prices.  Such  an  understanding  wilI  also aid energy  modeling  efforts by
showing  whether  we  can  study  these  markets  independently  or vrhether  we  must
account  for the interactions between  them.
Our  findings suggest  that the relationship betvreen  coal  , natural gas  and
ojl  has  changed,  and,  consistent  with conventional  wisdom,  oil  has  dominated
these  markets  over the past twenty  years.  Consequently,  no model  of the
energy  narket  will  be  complete  without  oil.
A Brief  History of  Coal  , cas and  Oil  llarkets
Coal  , natural gas  and  oil  constitute nore than 88 percent  of total  U.S.
energy  consumption,  The  United  States  is relatively self sufficient in coal
and  natural gas, exporting  13  percent  of coal production  and  importing  only
9.2 percent  of natural gas  consuned.  The  United  States is more  reliant  on
world  supplies  of oil,  importing 44.7  percent  of the total oii  and  productsconsumed  dornestically. To better understand  the relationships between  these
three fuels, which  are the backbone  of our energy  consumption,  we  briefly
survey  a history of coal  , natural gas  and  oil  markets  after l{l'lll.
The  coal industry declined  substantially after lllllI,  but a turnaround
that began  in the early I960s  has  been  sustajned  and  production  has  been  on an
upward  trend since.  The  declines  after l.lllllI  were  in the household  and
transportation sectors, but increasing  demand  from  the electricity  sector
eventually  offset these  declines, leading  to a resurgence  in the coal industry
in the 1960s  (Zimmerman  I98l).  Gordon  (1987)  argues  that coal was  never  a
favored  fuel  jn the United  States, and  environmental  programs  - beginning  with
the National Environmental  Policy Act in 1969  -  increased  the cost of using
and  producing  coal  .  Coal  production  declined  sl  ightly  after reaching  a decade
high in  1970. However,  the oil  embargo  of 1973-74  increased  the demand  for
coal and  catapulted  real coal prices  to an  all-time high  in 1975. Coal  use  in
electricity production  increased  dramatically,  and  coal production  in the
United  States has  been  on an upward  trend since then.  Real  coal prices have
been  decl  ining since 1975  however,  due  to increasing  productivity in the coal
sector.
The  natural gas  market  has  historjcally  been  a heavily regulated  market,
only recently have  regulations  been  eased. The  natural gas  market  has  been
regulated  since the passage  of the Natural  Gas  Act (NGA)  of 1938. The  NGA
regulated  the pipelines' entry into and  exit  from  the market  and  also
regulated  the rates they would  charge  and  the services  they would  provide.  In
1954,  wellhead  prices of interstate gas  were  regulated.  As Teece  (1990)
explains, the NGA's  "just  and  reasonable  price" was  based  on average,
histonical costs of production  and  was  below  the market  value of natural gasin the 1960s  and  1970s,  especjally  after the 1973  oil  price hike. The
regulations  made  natural gas  prices unresponsive  to market  forces and  led to
shortages  in some  markets  and  gluts in others,  The  Natural  Gas  Po1  icy Act
(NGPA)  of  1978  began  the deregulation  of wellhead  natural gas  prices, and  by
1990,  deregulation  was  virtualiy conplete.
The  pipeline segment  of the natural gas industry also has  been
deregulated,  causing  natural gas  prices in all  end-use  markets  to be  more
responsive  to market  fundamentals.  Until very recently, entry into the
pipeline market  was  restricted,  and  long-term  contracts  were  the rule in the
industry.  In 1985,  a new  pol  icy of open  access  to pipel  ines emphasized  their
role as carriers of gas  rather than as buyers  and  sel  lers of gas.  The  number
of contracts  dec.lined  substantial  1y with open  access. The  new  FERC  order 536
is designed  to complete  the transition to open  access  and  ensure  that gas
buyers  have  greater access  to a competitive  natural gas  market.  The  market
structure of the natural gas industry, along  with the existence  of long-term
contracts, regulation, and  access  to the spot market  have  all  affected the
price of natural  gas  and  its  abil  ity to be  competitive  with coal and  oil
pri  ces  .
The  history of the oil  sector is nruch  better known  than that of the
natural gas  or coal industries.  0il  has  constituted a much  larger portion of
the total  energy  consumed  by the United  States  since the end  of t'lt{I  I  and  a
disruption in suppl  ies or a change  in price has  rnore  repercussions  than for
any  other fuel  .  The  inportance  of the Middle  East  as a producing  region has
a1  so grown  since Ul,lII,  and  the l4iddle  East  will  remain  dominant  until  Russia
and  China,  among  other regions, are nore fully  explored.
l4ultinational  oi1 companies  were  the key  players  in the Middle  Eastuntil  the Teheran  Agreement  in 1971. Although  the 0rganization  of Petroleum
Exporting  Countries  (0PEC)  had  been  formed  in 1960,  the OPEC  countries had  not
been  very  active in setting oil  prices, nor  d.id  they  have  much  equity in the
producing  properties.  OPEC  countries' equity in producing  properties
increased  steadily after  1973,  reaching  60 percent  by January  1974  and  100
percent  for almost  all  members  after  1980, l{jth increasjng  equity interest in
producing  properties came  increased  control of oi1 prices.  In late 1973,  0PEC
announced  production  cutbacks  and  an embargo  on oil  suppl  ies to the United
States  in retaliation for U.S.  support  of Israel in the Arab-Israeli  war.  By
January  1974,  oil  prices had  more  than tripled  in the world market. The
Iranian  revolution  led to another  spike  in oil  prices  in 1979,  and  prices
climbed  to $36  per barrel by 1981  .  However,  increased  prices 1ed  to
conservation  efforts  and  increased  production  outside  of OPEC.  Coupled  with
low demand  due  to slow  econonic  growth,  oil  prices plummeted  to about  $11  per
barrel in 1986. Since  then, oil  prices have  ratcheted  up to around  $20  per
barrel  , with another  brief  spike of near  $40  per barrel in  1990  due  to the
Gul  f  tlar.
Empirical  Anal  ysi  s
The  above  summary  of coal  , natural gas  and  oil  markets  i l lustrates the
changes  these  markets  have  undergone  since l'lUII.  It  is reasonable  to expect
changes  in the price re1  ationships  between  these  fuels in the same  time frame.
To  analyze  the coal  , natural  gas  and  oil markets,  we  utilize time  series
methods. The  econometric  work  involves  a number  of steDs,  l,le  first  check
whether  the price series are stationary, and  find that all  of them  have
stochastic trends (or are integrated).  For each  of the series, we  then testfor cointegration and  use  a series of reduced-fonn  vector error-  correct  i  on
models  to test  for  causality and  adjustment  to equi  librium emor.  tde  then
calculate the sources  of long-run  price shocks  and  the persistence  of these
price shocks.
Estimation  and  testing uses  annual  data from  the period 1947  - 1990. l,le
use  minemouth  prices for bituminous  coal and  anthracite for the coal price
variable,  refiners' acquisition  cost for oil,  and  wellhead  prices  for natural
gas.  A1l prices  are  on  a Btu  basis.
There  have  been  structural changes  in the oil  market  during these  years,
as explained  earlier.  Greater  0PEC  control over oi'l prices and  the tripling
of prices  took  place  in 1974. Therefore,  in addition  to using  the full
sample,  we  divide the sanple  period into two subsamples,  1948  -  1974  and
1975  - 1990  to see  whether  the relationship between  coal  , gas and  oi1 prices
has  changed  over the two periods.
Integrat'l  on and Goi  ntegrati on
In an earl  ier  paper  using  the same  data series, we  found  all  series to
be integrated  of order one  for  all  sample  periods (see  Yiicel  and  Guo  1993).
lle also found  the series to be cointegrated  in the two subsample  periods, but
not in the full  samole.
An integrated  time series impl  ies that any  shock  to the tine  series will
be permanent  and  that the series will  not revert back  to its  mean  after the
shock. Two  integrated  time series are cointegrated  if  they nove  together;
cointegration  implies  a stationary,  long-term  re'lationship  between  theseri  es  .  '
In YUcel  and  Guo  (1993)  we  find that coal and  oil  are cointegrated  in
the earl  ier  subsample,  1947  -1974. The  relationship between  the fuels changes
after  1974. lie find that natural gas is also cointegrated  with coal and  oil
during  1975-1990.  The  relationship  is such  that a I percent  change  in oil
prices would  lead to nearly a 1 percent  change  in natural gas  prices, but only
a half a percentage  change  in coal prices in the iong run,  These
cointegration  results are integrated  into the VAR  nodel  we  use  for  our
causal  ity  tests  .
Causal  i ty
A causal  relationship between  two variables implies that changes  in one
variable  lead  to changes  in the other.  To  test for a predictive  relationship
between  the variables, we  perfonned  Granger  causality tests on pairs of the
three fuel pri  ces.
Because  all  our price series were  cointegrated,  we  accounted  for
cointegration  by specifying an error-  correct  i  on model  in which  changes  in the
dependent  variable are expressed  as changes  in both the independent  variable
and  dependent  variable, plus an error  -  correct  i  on term.  The  error-  correct  i  on
term  specifies  the adjustment  to equilibrium  error, i.e,,  the adjustment  to
deviations  from  the long-run  cointegrating  relationship. The  coefficient on
the equilibrium  error, o, specifies  what  proportion  of the disequil  ibrium  from
one  period is corrected  in the next period.?
'If  cojntegration  is not accounted  for, any  model  involving  the
cointegrated  variables would  be  misspecified  and/or  the parameter  estimates
could  be underest  i  mated.
2  See  Engle  and  Granger  (1987).The  tests first  involved  estimating  a reduced-form  VAR  model  comprising
the following  set of equations  for each  pair of prices:
AC.  = f,=1 alAGt-i  + fj=1 bjAor_,  + I*=.,c*AC,-.  + c',CI.-n-.  +  p.,.  (l)
AG.  =f,=re;A0,-, +Ir=,frAct-j  +Tk=lgkAct_k  +ozclt-n-1  +tr12t  G)
A0.  =f,=rm;AC,-,  +fr=,prAG.-,  +8.=rQ*AOt-k  +%Clt-n-l  +p3t  (3)
where: C is the log of the price of coal  ,
G  is the iog of the price for natural  gas,
0 is the 1og  of the price of oil,
CI js the errors in the cointegrating  relationship,  (C,-
F1  Gt+Bt  ;s
ap b;, c1, ep  f;r  91, mir P;  r Qp dr' %, cl3  afe pafameters  to
be estinated, and
Frt and  Fzt,  l4t are white noise.a
The  coefficients ol , o, and  o,  represent  the adjustment  to
equi  1i  bri  um  emor,
All  varjables  are  expressed  in logarithms.
Causality  runs from  natural gas  prices to coal prices if  at and  the ai
jointly  are statistically different from  zero.  Similarly, causality  runs
from  oil  prices  to coal prices  if q  and  the b, are  jointly  statistically
different  fron zero.  If  both sets of coefficients are significantly  different
from  zero, causality is bi-directional .  The  same  analysis holds for equations
3  The  error-  correct  i  on term is  included  because  all  prices are
cointegrated  with each  other (see  Engle  and  Granger  (1987).
"  The  value of n was  set in the Johansen  procedure  to assure  white noise
in the residuals.2 and  3.
As shown  in Table  1, causality results are dependent  upon  the time
period under  analysis.  lle find no causality (at the 5 percent  level)  between
any  pairs of prices  for the fu11  sample  period  1947-1990.  This  again  leads  us
to suspect  that the turmoil in the oil  market  in the early 1970s  changed  the
relationships between  these  fuel prices in such  a way  that no consistent
relationship  exists for the entire time  horizon. Looking  at the two
subperiods,  we  do find a change  in the causal  re'lationship  between  the prices.
In the period ending  in 1974,  we  find that al'l prices cause  shocks  in the
prices  with which  they  are  paired.
In the later period,  1975-1990,  we  find bi-directional  causality  between
natural  gas  and  coai pnices  but not with oil  prices.  In this period,  shocks
in oil  prices  cause  shocks  in natural  gas  and  coal prices, but do  not respond
to changes  in coal or natural  gas  prices.  This  result is consistent  with the
nevt  order in the oil  market  with the energence  of 0PEC.  After the early
1970s,  the price of oil  was  controlled by 0PEC  and  was  not responsive  to
shocks  in donestic  coal or natural gas  prices,  From  the early 1970s  on,
changes  in oil  prices  began  to lead  changes  in all  other  fuei prices.
Adjustment  to Equil  i brium  Error
If  there is cointegration  between  a number  of variables, any  movement
away  from  the long-run  cointegrating  relationship will  eventually  be corrected
and  the vaniables  will  rnove  back  into their long-run  relationship. The
adjustment  could be through  one, two or all  of the variables.  llhich variable
adiusts  to equilibrium  enor depends  on  many  factors, includ.ing  elasticities
and  market  structure.In a cointegrated  system  (such  as that represented  by equations  I
through  3),  the presence  of an enor-correction term impl  ies that the
dependent  variable  adjusts  to equilibriun  error.  The  coefficient on  the
equilibrium  error, ci,  reflects the extent  to which  a given  price variable
reacts  in the short  run to deviations  fron its long-run  relationship  with
another  price variable.  In the equations  where  the  q is significant, the
dependent  variable  adjusts  to deviations  from  the cointegrating  relationship.
In equations  where  the  a is not significant, the dependent  variable  does  not
adjust  to deviations  from  the cointegrating  relationship.
As shown  in Table  2, in the tine period between  1947  and  1974,  a'll
prices adjust if  there is  a movement  away  from  equilibrium.  The  quickest
adjustment  is made  by coal and  o'il, while natural gas  prices adjust more
s1ow1y,  This  evidence  is consjstent  with our institutional knowl  edge  about
the three markets. The  natural gas  market  in this  period  was  under  price
controls, and  slow  adjustment  is consistent  with price controls.  The  coal and
oil  markets  were  nore competitive,  and  adjustment  was  faster.
In the 1975-1990  time  period,  we  find that oil  prices  do  not adiust  to
deviations  fron equilibrium. As  Table  2 shows,  the  c in the oil  equation  is
not significant.  An  insignificant  o implies  weak  exogeneity  of the oil  price
variable,  which  is consistent  with 0PEC's  impact  on and  relative control  of
wor'ld  oil  prices after the early seventies.  Both  coal and  natural gas  prices
adjust  to devjations  from  the equilibrium  relationship  in this time  period.
tlith the gradual  deregulation  of the natural gas  market  that began  in 1978  and
with the establishment  of the spot market  for  natural gas in 1985,  gas  prices
have  become  much  more  responsive  to changing  market  conditions.  lle find that
the natural gas  market  adjusts fastest to deviations  from  long-run  equil  ibrium
t0during  the 1975-1990  period.
Long-Run  Source  of Yari  ance
To find out which  prices were  the most  likely  sources  of shocks,  we  use
the Choleski  decomposition  to calculate  the variance  decomposition.t  The
variance  decomposition  apportions  the variance  of effors in a given price to
emors in the three different  energy  prices.
In the earlier  time peri  od  ,  1947  -197  4, the long-run  source  of variance
is invariant  to the ordering  of the variables  in the equations.  l{e  find that
coal prices are the long-run  source  of shocks  for all  three prices.
In the 1975-lgg0  period,  the ordering  of the variables  changes  the
results.  llhen  ordering  changes  the source  of long-run  variance  for the
prices,  we  prefer the ordering  in which  innovations  in oil  prices  are  placed
first.  This ordering  presumes  that shocks  are rnost  likely  to originate in oi1
prices, which  fits  our priors that oPEC  becane  a force to reckon  with in the
world  oil  market  during  this time  period.  If  the change  in oi1 prices is
p1  aced  first,  then oil  prices are a very strong source  of variance, accounting
for almost  100  percent  of the variance  in oil  and  gas  prices.  In the coal
equation,  both oil  and  coal prices are equal  sources  of shock.
The  results of the coal equation  are  consistent  with institutional
developments  in the energy  markets. Coal  and  oil  were  not competing  fuels in
5The  Choleski  decomposition  decomposes  the residuals,  trl,r  and  g2t into two
sets of  impulses  which  are orthogonal  to each  other.  0rthogon  al  i  zatl  on allows
one  to take covariance  between  the residuals into account,
The  Choleski  decomposition  imposes  a recursive structure on the system
in which  the ordering  of the dependent  variables  is specified.  If  the
covariance  between  the residuals is sufficiently  high, the ordering  can  affect
the results.  lle experimented  with permutations  of the changes  in all  the
prr  ces  .
ltmany  of the end-use  sectors  by this  time,  Coal  had  a very snali share  in the
transportation sector, and  a relatively  smal1  share  in the industrial  sector
that continued  to decl  ine throughout  the time horizon,  0n the other hand,  the
share  of oil  in the generation  of electricity had  declined  considerably,  while
the share  of coal had  grown. Therefore,  it  makes  sense  that oil  is not the
dominant  source  of variance  in this market. Demand  or supply  shocks  to coal
are also sources  of shock  in the coal market.
Concl  us  i on
For successful  energy  policy, an understanding  of the interrelationships
between  different  energy  markets  is  imperative.  Especially  when  policy
targets  specific fuels, the long-run  relationships  between  the fuels will
determine  the success  of the po1  icy.
Our  analysis shows  that the long-run  relationships between  coal  , natural
gas  and  oi1 prices  have  changed  since  l.ll{II. This is evident  from  our finding
no cointegration or causality between  the three fuels in the full  sample  and
finding djfferent relationships  between  the fuels in the two  subsamples.
Before  the oil  price shocks  of the early I970s, no fuel dominated  the
energy  market. lie found  bi-directional  causality  among  all  three  fuels, all
fuel prices adjusted  to deviations  fron long-run  equilibrium, and  the source
of shocks  was  coal  ,  invariant to ordering.
Our  econometric  tests are evidence  that oil  became  the doninant  fuel
after  1974,  consistent  with conventional  wisdom, After 1974,  a change  in oil
prices causes  changes  in coal and  natural gas  prices, but not vice versa.
l4oreover,  if  there is a movement  away  from  equilibrium, adjustment  back  to
equil  ibriun is not through  oi1 prices but through  adjustments  in coal and
12natural gas  prices.  Oil  is also the source  of shocks  to the oil  and  natural
gas  market.  It  is not the sole source  of shocks  in the coal market,
underscoring  how  end-use  markets  for these  two fuels has  diverged  in the past
twenty  years.
Our  findings a1  so suggest  that modeling  the coal and  gas  markets  after
1974  v{ithout  including  oil  would  lead  to a misspecification  of the model  ,  0n
the other hand,  using  oil  prices as a proxy  for energy  prices would  not be
such  a grave  error.
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